This essay offers a two-part objection to the dilemma presented above. First, I argue that the plenary power doctrine goes against the spirit of the U.S. Constitution, specifically the Fourteenth Amendment. Non-citizens, even undocumented immigrants, are entitled to more Constitutional protections than they currently enjoy. Second, since extending these protections is more consistent with the spirit of the Constitution, I argue that curtailing the federal government's power over immigration does not undermine its sovereignty, but promotes it. In short, with regard to immigration, it is a false but seductive dichotomy that constitutional democracies must choose between a state of nature and a state of exception.
Sovereignty as a Response to the State of Nature
In Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes famously made the case that in order to get out of a state of war, the establishment and maintenance of a unitary and absolute sovereign would be required. In presenting his case Hobbes addressed three aspects of sovereignty: how political power is made legitimate, where it should be located, and to what degree it can be wielded.
3 With regard to the first, Hobbes argued that political power is legitimate if everyone could ideally consent to it, and at the same time, would not be put in a worse position than that characterized by the state of nature. As for the other two, Hobbes's answer was that political power should be absolute, undivided and concentrated in the hands of one body.
This extremely strong notion of sovereignty was necessary, Hobbes argued, because anything less would put us in a state of nature, which for him was essentially a state of war; a state where everyone has a right to everything and everyone is equal, but only because anyone can potentially kill anyone else. In Hobbes's words, it is a place where the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." 4 Hobbes concedes that there might never have been an actual state of nature, but he argues that it is nonetheless a possibility that must always be guarded against. A strong sovereign, Hobbes argued, would be sufficient to neutralize the threat of both lawlessness and a lack of personal safety.
With respect to the current issue of immigration, Phillip Cole argues that there are two versions of the Hobbesian view (with which neither he nor I agree). The first is the external view: "the international 'order' is a There are three critical responses to the Hobbesian view of sovereignty. The first is the liberal response, which holds that the liberty concern, and not the security concern, is primary. John Locke is usually credited with having articulated this view. Locke, unlike Hobbes, argued that the state of nature is not a state of war, but a place where liberty reigns supreme and at worst is only an inconvenient place to live. 9 Working with this understanding of the state of nature, Locke did not believe that there could ever be a reason or need to grant any person, or body, absolute political power.
10
The second response to Hobbes is the conservative response, best exemplified by David Hume and Edmund Burke.
11 This response rejects the notion that a legitimate government requires the consent of those ruled. In a nutshell, the conservative view holds that tradition and habit, not consent, provides political regimes with their legitimacy and stability (i.e., law and order). Therefore, according to this response, preserving tradition does more to address the security concern than does obtaining a reasoned consensus.
The third response to Hobbes, and the one I will focus on in this essay, is the state of exception response. In the next section I will provide a fuller account of this response, but here I want to point out why this response is different from the two just mentioned. First, as opposed to the liberal response, the state of exception response continues to make security rather than liberty, its primary concern. This is important because if forced to choose between liberty and security, some would gladly give up their liberty for security. In those cases, the force of the two Hobbesian views mentioned above-the external and the internal justifications for unilateral immigration controlswould continue to hold sway against liberal objections. Second, unlike the conservative response, the state of exception response is not worried about whether the Hobbesian sovereign can provide law and order. The state of exception response is more concerned with personal safety rather than overall social stability. According to the state of exception response, the threat to personal safety is never neutralized but is in fact aggravated when the sovereign is granted unrestrained power-even when doing so makes society more stable. In this case, neither external nor internal threats provide sufficient justification for a Hobbesian-style sovereign because in neither case does it deliver on the personal safety aspect of the security concern.
Sovereignty as the Condition for the State of Exception
Giorgio Agamben offers the third response to Hobbes. According to Agamben, the state of exception describes a situation where subjects have been "abandoned" by the sovereign. By abandonment, Agamben means a life ("bare-life") that is no longer protected by the sovereign, but remains exposed to its potential violence. 12 In short, Agamben's worry is that while Hobbes's sovereign provides security in the form of law and order, it also introduces insecurity in the form of unrestrained sovereign power.
In making his case, Agamben relies heavily on the work of Hannah Arendt and Walter Benjamin. Agamben argues that Benjamin is prophetic in showing the link "between the violence that posits law and the violence that preserves it."
13 Here, Agamben is referring to what he calls the paradox of sovereignty: the sovereign's ability to be both inside and outside the law. The sovereign's ability to operate outside the law is justified in so far as it establishes and maintains law and order. This ability is also only meant for very exceptional circumstances and only for brief amounts of time. Yet, Agamben argues that what is supposed to be a brief exception tends to become the norm, and thereby itself becomes a threat to security, specifically the personal safety of all individuals because eventually everyone becomes susceptible to being abandoned. The thrust of Agamben's criticism of Hobbes is that in order for Hobbes's notion of sovereignty to function properly, it needs to be able to be -191 - both inside and outside law, but it is this ability that produces the threat of the state of exception, which then undermines the very concern (i.e., security) Hobbes had set out to address. Agamben's critique of sovereignty not only has serious ramifications for Hobbes, but for all political philosophers who give priority to the security concern. It seems that the very notion of sovereignty creates as big of a security problem as the one it was intended to solve. One possible response would be to dispense with the notion of sovereignty and resort to subverting, as much as possible, all forms of concentrated political power and authority. If we opt for this alternative, however, it seems that we only re-open the state of nature threat: how can law and order be established and maintained? In short, it seems that Agamben brings us to a very unpleasant conclusion: we are left either with a state of nature or a state of exception.
What does this mean for immigration policy? As mentioned in the introduction, the U.S. federal government has enjoyed plenary power over immigration since at least the second half of the nineteenth century. Plenary power allows the federal government to regulate immigration free of judicial review, meaning the federal government has the power to admit, exclude, and expel non-citizens as it sees fit. One way to understand this is that, with regard to immigration cases, non-citizens have been abandoned by the U.S. government and therefore live in a state of exception. Most people would be aghast at this and would hope that all people have some protections against sovereign power. As we have seen, however, limiting the power of the sovereign (in this case the federal government) could undermine its legitimacy and potentially reduce or expose it to a state of nature. This is not my conclusion. The case I want to make is that non-citizens, including undocumented immigrants, should be afforded some Constitutional protections, thus removing them from something like a state of exception. Furthermore, granting non-citizens Constitutional protections will not undermine U.S. sovereignty, but will be more consistent with it. This means that escaping the state of exception does not necessitate the possibility of a state of nature or vice-versa. In order to make this case, however, we see that there are two prongs that must be addressed. In the following section I will address both of these in reverse order from how I have presented them. First, I will address Agamben's worry about the state of exception and then I will address Hobbes's worry about the state of nature.
Subverting The Plenary Power Doctrine
In general, my response to the first prong is that judicial review can ameliorate many of the worries associated with the state of exception. By judicial review, I mean that the actions of the executive and legislative branches are subjected to possible Constitutional invalidation by the judiciary branch. The 1958 Trop v. Dulles case provides us with a great example in this regard. In that case, the U.S. government attempted to strip Albert Trop of his citizenship as a form of punishment. The Supreme Court ruled, however, that stripping a person of his citizenship was a violation of the 8th Amendment (i.e., protection against cruel and unusual punishment). Chief Justice Warren, delivering the majority opinion, reasoned, in this long but important passage, that as a form of punishment, taking away one's citizenship would constitute the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society [and] is a form of punishment more primitive than torture. . . . The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community. . . . In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights. . . . This punishment is offensive to cardinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the individual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress.
He knows not what discriminations may be established against him, what proscriptions may be directed against him, and when and for what cause his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international community of democracies. It is no answer to suggest that all the disastrous consequences of this fate may not be brought to bear on a stateless person. The threat makes the punishment obnoxious.
14 The law in this case not only sided with the potential Muselmann (Agamben's exemplar of "bare life") over and against the sovereign, but it did so for reasons and concerns not dissimilar to those articulated by Agamben. My point with this example is not to argue that the U.S. Supreme Court is perfect, beyond reproach and always on the side of the most oppressed (far from it), but to show, contra Agamben, that the law can at times be the only thing that protects the most vulnerable from the full wrath of the sovereign's powers. Assuming for the moment that judicial review can ameliorate many of Agamben's concerns, this brings us to the second prong: Does extending judicial review to immigration cases involving non-citizens undermine U.S. sovereignty? My answer is no. Extending judicial review to these cases will not undermine U.S. sovereignty, but is in fact more consistent with it. This is so because one of the principle aims of the U.S. Constitution is to disperse and check sovereign powers, not to enhance them. One obvious reason the U.S. Constitution aims to check and disperse sovereign power is its concern with liberty (see the Lockean response above), but another reason is its concern with protecting those who are subject to the law from undue governmental infringements. This concern is made evident in the Fourteenth Amendment, which states that: "No State shall…deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The key term in this passage is person, which by 15 This ruling has infamously come to be known as the "separate-but-equal" doctrine.
Similarly, in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Chinese Exclusion Act. The case revolved around whether Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese national and legal permanent resident of the United States could reenter the United States. Ping had left for a visit to China in 1887 and during his return voyage Congress amended the Chinese Exclusion Act to discontinue the policy of return vouchers for Chinese nationals. When Ping arrived at the port of San Francisco, he was thus refused reentry. Ping sued to be admitted on the grounds that the amendment barring his reentry was ex post facto and therefore a violation of his constitutional rights. Ping's case was eventually heard by the Supreme Court, which ruled that the idea that the United States, through the action of the legislative department, can exclude [non-citizens] from its territory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could not exclude [non-citizens] it would be to that extent subject to the control of another power. 16 In other words, the Supreme Court ruled that, because the U.S. is a sovereign nation, the federal government has the authority to exclude non-citizens and to do so free of judicial review. The ex post facto nature of Ping's exclusion, which normally would be a violation of his rights, was therefore preempted in this case by the federal government's sovereign prerogative to admit and exclude non-citizens as it deems fit. This case set the precedent that, with respect to issues of admission and exclusion, non-citizens have no claims that the federal government is bound to respect.
The 
